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As astounding as it sounds, especially to people outside of the USA (and the Middle East,
and much of Africa), 13 % of US high school teachers actively advocate creationism and
so-called intelligent design theory in their classrooms; another 28 % does the right thing
and teaches evolution, but a whopping 60 % falls in the middle: These teachers accept
evolutionary theory (though they may be fuzzy on the details), and yet do not teach it in
their classrooms, in order to avoid ‘‘the controversy’’ (Berkman and Plutzer 2010). It is
largely at this 60 %, and to interested undergraduate and graduate students, that Kampo-
urakis’ new book is aimed.
As the author quickly acknowledges, there are plenty of good books on evolution out
there: from introductions aimed at the general public (Coyne 2009) to sophisticated
textbooks (Futuyma 2013), from philosophical analyses (Ruse 2003) to discussions of the
so-called evolution–creation controversy (Pigliucci 2002), and many, many more. So why
another one, other than because—as the ancient Romans were fond of saying—repetita
iuvant (to repeat does good)? Because, argues Kampourakis, contra to a widespread
assumption among educators, the biological theory of evolution is actually counterintui-
tive, and if not properly taught, it immediately runs into incomprehension and generates
conceptual confusion.
The author is not as naive as to suggest that the only, or indeed even the primary, reason
why we still have a creation–evolution debate 90 years after the scopes trial and more than
a century and a half after the publication of the Origin of Species is that people are
confused about what the theory actually says. Surely social and especially ideological
forces, particularly religious fundamentalism and its connection with extreme right-wing
politics, get a lot of the blame here. But very good books on that aspect of the problem
have already come out, and Kampourakis has identified a lacuna in the recent literature: It
is hard to find a clear compelling explanation of why exactly evolution is so difficult to
understand for so many people. The chief goal of his book, then, becomes to fill this
lacuna. This is attempted in six chapters that cover how we know what we know about
evolution (i.e., that it is a fact), why there is religious resistance to accepting the idea, what
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the major conceptual (as distinct from ideological) obstacles to acceptance are, the concept
of common ancestry, and the mechanisms of evolutionary change (not just natural selec-
tion, but also the stochastic aspects of the process).
Chapter 4 of the book stands apart from the rest, in my mind, and for interesting reasons.
The title of the chapter is rather self-explanatory: ‘‘Charles Darwin and the Origin of
Species: A historical case study of conceptual change,’’ and it may superficially look as yet
another glorifying exegesis of one of the best known (and, admittedly, most important)
books in the intellectual history of humanity. But Kampourakis’ writing here does a rather
different, and very pertinent thing: It is a careful analysis of how Darwin’s theory itself
‘‘evolved’’ (in the sense of developed, of course) over his lifetime.
The most interesting part of this analysis begins on p. 108, when Kampourakis delves
into a conceptual dissection of the Darwinian theory. Figure 4.3 in the book (p. 113) is a
compelling summary of the major phases of the evolution of Darwin’s thinking, which the
author divides into three phases: From his 1835 visit to the Galapagos Island to 1839, by
which time Darwin already had an outline of his theory of natural selection, he thought in
terms of perfect adaptations, essentially still in the mold of Paley-style natural theology,
but with an increasingly naturalistic twist.
Things began to change in the years leading to 1842, when Darwin wrote his Sketch of
the Theory, continuing into 1854 and the completion of his study on barnacles. During this
time frame, Darwin still thought of adaptations as perfect, but in a more ‘‘limited’’ fashion,
so to speak. Finally, from his 1857 abstract of the theory, sent to his colleague and friend
Asa Gray, to the actual publication of the Origin in 1859, Darwin shifted to a more modern
consideration of adaptations as relative to specific environments and certainly not perfect
in any meaningful sense of the term.
But perhaps my favorite figure in the entire book is 4.4 (p. 120), a flow chart of the
conceptual foundations of the arguments presented by Darwin in the Origin. One of the
most obvious things that jump to the reader’s attention in the diagram is the extensive use
made by Darwin of arguments from analogy: the analogy between artificial and natural
selection, between the struggle for existence in human societies (Malthus) and the struggle
for existence in nature, and between the division of labor in human societies (Adam Smith)
or the physiological division of labor in living organisms (Milne-Edwards) and ecological
specialization causing divergence among species. If this sort of thing doesn’t make clear
how Darwin developed his argument, I don’t know what will.
There are a number of similar gems scattered throughout Kampourakis’ book. For
instance, on p. 52, we find a table (2.1) that presents a comparative overview of the
positions taken by three prominent evolutionary biologists—Richard Dawkins, Stephen
Gould, and Conway Morris—on the relation between science and religion, which itself is,
of course, at the core of the creation–evolution wars. It will be good for teachers and
students alike to find out that Dawkins-style atheism is by far not the only (or perhaps even
the most common) position on the question adopted by biologists, and I say this quite
regardless of the fact that I find myself somewhere between Gould’s agnosticism and
Dawkins’ atheism and certainly far from Morris’ religiosity.
Just a couple of pages down, we find table 2.2, a synopsis of three major ways of
grounding one’s beliefs: causal, justificational, and epistemic. Kampourakis explains the
differences among them by way of a simple example involving his wife and the dinner he
believes she has prepared for him: ‘‘I smell my favorite food and I believe that my wife is
cooking it’’ is an example of causal grounding of his belief; by contrast, ‘‘I smell my
favorite food and my wife told me this morning that she would do it’’ is an instance of
justificational belief; finally, ‘‘I smell my favorite food and I saw my wife in the kitchen
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cooking it’’ is a type of epistemic explanation for the belief. (As a side note, it would have
been refreshing if the author had put himself in the role of cook, thus challenging the
cultural stereotype, but this is obviously not a substantive criticism.)
There are examples in the book that I am not quite so fond of, for instance figure 3.6 (p.
85), where Kampourakis presents an imaginary phylogenetic diagram featuring human-
made objects such as airplanes, ships, and so forth. Although he hastens to write in the
caption that ‘‘this depiction is, of course, incorrect as these artifacts have independent
origins,’’ I’m afraid students inclined toward intelligent design will gloss over that caveat
and persist in their anthropomorphic way of seeing things.
Then again, the comparison—in figure 5.4 (p. 136) between human genealogies and
biological phylograms is one that I think is surprisingly underutilized in the teaching of
evolution, and it ought to immediately clear things up when students ask questions along
the lines of: ‘‘if we come from apes, how is it that both we and the chimpanzees are still
alive?’’ The answer, of course, is the same as if one were asking how is it possible that my
cousin is alive at the same time as me, even though we share common ancestors.
Kampourakis does not shy from the treatment of more sophisticated issues in evolu-
tionary biology, or even from using a modicum of technical jargon. The book includes
discussions of symplesiomorphies and synapomorphies, of the difference between genetic
drift and genetic draft, as well as of the distinction between adaptation and exaptation. It
also clearly shows (by now well known, but always spectacularly clear) examples of
transitional fossils, like those marking the evolution of whales (fig. 5.17, p. 153), thus
answering yet another persistent, if misguided, creationist question (‘‘if evolution is a
gradual process, where are all the intermediaries?’’).
Figure 5.21 (p. 160) very clearly explains to the reader why it is a misconception to
think of individuals (as opposed to populations) as the units of evolution, but it also
introduces the evo-devo (evolution of development) perspective, thus bringing the reader
up to speed with current thinking in the field.
The discussion of modes of speciation (pp. 191–200) will not make some more orthodox
evolutionary biologists too happy, because it presents the difference between sympatric
and allopatric speciation as a continuum, rather than a simple dichotomy, and because it
introduces students to the still somewhat controversial idea of species selection. But I think
Kampourakis is exactly right on both counts, and teachers and students do need to be
exposed to cutting edge ideas in science, even ideas that may eventually be rejected as
inviable. Too often we present science as a monolithic and unchangeable body of results,
indirectly reinforcing the comparison with scriptures and the misperception that science is
just another belief system.
The book concludes by zooming out, so to speak, into broader conceptual space, pre-
senting the reader with a discussion of evolution as a theory within the context of what,
exactly, makes for a good scientific theory to begin with. Kampourakis draws a crucial
distinction between what a theory—any theory, not just evolution—cannot explain versus
what it has not explained yet. The Darwinian theory of evolution cannot and will not
explain, say, the origin of life, because by definition before life appeared, there were no
populations of organisms capable of variation and inheritance, the fundamental conditions
for evolution to take place. That job, therefore, belongs to biophysics rather than evolu-
tionary biology, and the common insistence to the contrary on the part of creationists
betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the scope of scientific theorizing.
However, there are also biological facts well within the potential purview of Darwinian
explanations that have not, so far, actually been explained (and perhaps never will be).
Take, for instance, the so-called Cambrian explosion, the (geologically) rapid
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diversification of myriad new animal forms that eventually gave rise to most of the phyla
we know today. Plenty of accounts have been proposed for the phenomenon, but there
hardly is a consensus within the pertinent epistemic community (i.e., evolutionary biolo-
gists and paleontologists). This, however, cannot be impugned as an example of ‘‘failure’’
of the theory, no more than, say, the fact that quantum mechanics and general relativity
give incompatible answers about the physics of black holes should be taken as a good
reason to reject either of those physical theories. Scientific theories are dynamic, ever
changing, perpetually incomplete and open to revision human constructs to make sense of
the world. The more the public at large understands this, the better off we will be, and
books like Kampourakis’ certainly make a valuable contribution to nudging us into that
desirable direction.
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